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Draft Recommendation
on the future of European defence and its democratic scrutiny 
-
reply to the annual report of the Council
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling Recommendation 653, Order 108 and its Message to the Governments and Parlia-
ments of Europe. which concern secunt-v and defence: the challenge for Europe after Cologne and which
were adopted on 19 October 1999:
(ii) Welcoming the speed wrth which the Council transmitted the first part of its 45th annual report
to the Assembh'on the Council's actrvities,
0u) Surprised- nonetheless, that the annual report does not contain anv reference to the impact on
WEU of the decisions taken on 3 and 4 June 1999 in Cologne by the European Union heads of state and
government with a view to formulating a European secunt_v and defence policv (ESDP) and takrng re-
sponsibilrty for WEU's Petersberg missions;
(w) Recalhng that WEU at 28 is rvell ahead of the European Union and NATO rn having the mak-
ings of a secunty and defence Europe encompassing all the European countries rvhich are both ready for
it and qualif,' to be part of it, and thereby bnngs a considerably enhanced drmension to security and
stability m Europe;
(") Recalling that the effect of the determination of the European Umon governments to take re-
sponsibilrtv for WEU's cnsis-management functions, rvhich will henceforth be consigned to the single
framework of the second pillar, rvill be to reduce the number of particrpants in this project to fifteen
countries, five of whrch are still expressing major reservations about it:
(v) Feanng that the arangements currently being drscussed by the European Uruon member states
rvith a vie*'to involvrrg WEU's associate member and associate partners in the EU's securit_v and de-
fence policy wrll result in those countries berng sidelined, which wrll undermine all WEU has achieved
as a forerunner of secunq' and defence Europe;
(vtr) Reaffirming, therefore, the vrtal imporLance of WEU's mission, uhrch allows all the European
countries which do not 1'et qualif, for admission to all the EU pillars and/or to NATO to avail them-
selves of a framework in which they can participate in the construction of European defence,
(viri) Consrdenng the position of the United States, which has fundamental reservations about any
inclination on Europe's part to develop a capacitl,for autonomous militan'action, while many Ameri-
cans rlant Europe to make a greater effort to ensure its oun secunry:
(tx) Noting with disappointment that there is virrually no rvill in the European Union to have re-
course to WEU in the event of a cnsis or for any matters with defence rmplications:
(x) Fearing that the arrangements for enhanced cooperation betlveen the European Union and WEU
in pursuance of the Protocol on Article i7 of the Treaty on European Umon rnill prove too complex to
be rmplemented, particularly in the event of the sudden outbreak of an unforeseen crisis;
(xt) Stressing that it is therefore crucial to maintain all the decrsion-making and operational cap-
abilities available rn WEU and under its Treaty throughout the current interim penod and for as long is
the new structures it is planned to create in the European Union are not operational;
(ni) Recalling the importance of WEU's mission, w'hich is to cooperate closely wrth NATO and,
indeed, to ensure that any transfer of WEU's responsibilities to the European Union is not damaging to
transatlantic cohesion:
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(xttt) Reminding all WEU member countries that it rs therefore up to them. as members of the
European Union, to ensure that the decisions to be taken by the European Council in Helsinki should be
thought out rvrthout rushrng ard rvith all due care;
(xtv) Stressing once again that WEU will continue to be extremely rmportant for as long as it has to
oversee the application of Articles V, MII, IX and XI of the modified Brussels Treatl' and its protocols,
and the proper operation ofthe Council's subsidiary bodies;
(*) Stressing the importance of the development of WEAG as an essential forum for giving political
impetus to armaments cooperation, lnth the full participation of all the interested nations in the WEU
family;
(m) Convinced that the separation of crisis-management functions from collective defence removes
all justification for WEU's current enlargement policl' accordrng to u,hich a country must be both a
member of NATO and the European Union to qualifr for accession to the modified Brussels Treaty;
(mi) Recalling that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treatv created the Council wrthout defining
the institutional framework for its organisation.
(wiii) Reaffirmrng the importance of the democratic dimension of the European secunq' and defence
policl,and welcoming the value the Council attaches in its annual report to the contnbution of the WEU
Assembl1, and its Committees to the Orgamsation's work and the ongorng reflection on European secu-
riq'and defence,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.NCIL
1 . tnclude in its annual report a detailed study of the progress in negotiations among the European
Union member states and the drrection they follolv rn the rvake of the Cologne Declaration, together with
an assessment of the consequences this entails for future activities of the Council, its subsidiary bodies
and the Assembll';
2. Urge the WEU member countries, as members of the European Union, to ensure that the deci-
sions to be taken at the Helsinkr Summit are prepared rvithout rushing, while taking account of the need
to:
improve existing capabilities ;
adopt an inclusive approach; and
preserve the indivisibiliq, of European security;
3. Examrne in detail hos' it henceforth intends to fuIfil its obligations under the modified Brussels
Treatv. and particularlv under Article VIII, and inform the Assembly accordingly;
4. Renegotiate and simplifi.the arrangements and procedures for enhanced cooperation betrveen the
European Union and WEU under the Protocol on Article 17 of the Treaty'on European Union with a
vrew to giving WEU a more important role in the decision-makrng process;
5. Presen.e all the decision-maliing and operational capabilities it has to react in a crisis and apply
Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treatv in full for as long as the European Union does not avail
rtself of WEU and does not have the capaciq'to take action on ils ox'n.
6. Study'the possibility, in the light of the neu, situation. of inviting the associate member countries
to accede to the modified Brussels Treat1,, and of extending the application of the 11 May 1955 Agree-
ment on the status of WEU to all countnes participating in the activities of WEAG and WEAO;
7 . Enhance the status rvrthin WEU of the Organisation s new Secretary-General, along the lines of
the proposals made by the French President and German Chancellor in connection rvith the role in the
European Union of the Secretarv-General of the EU Council and High Representative for the CFSP;
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8. Explarn any differences between the CFSP, ESDP and ESDI, and the most appropnate way of
harmomsrng these three concepts;
9. Bring to the notice of the EU authonties the WEU Council's obligations towards the Assembly
and the terms of their relations under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, stressing that it is
important not to damage the quality and nature of those relations and that the Assembly, wluch as a
WEU body is an integral part of the development of the European Uruon, is prepared to establish ap-
propnate cooperation arrangements wrth the European Parliament, on the basis of the complementanty
of the remrts of both assemblies.
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Explanatory Memoran du m
(submitted by Mr Marshall, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. In adoptrng its Plan for Action on 16
March 1999, the Assembly's purpose rvas to take
a qualitative leap forward rn order to give the
European Union a political and operational de-
fence capability, without making further as-
sumptions about the rnstitutional shape of things
to come. To that end it proposed proceedrng in
stages and beginning by placing all WEU's cap-
abilities under the authority of the European
Council. Yet at the Cologne Summit the Euro-
pean Council announced more far-reaching am-
bitions and set itself a very short space of time rn
which to achieve them. Tlus presents the gov-
ernments concerned with a huge challenge since
failure to do so could result in a serious setback
with major consequences for political develop-
ments in Europe.
2. After makrng a preliminary assessment of
the Washington and Cologne decisions in the
report submitted on 10 June i999 by Mr Baumel
on behalf of the Political Committeel, the As-
sembly decided to mstruct the Commrttee to
carr)' out a more detarled analysis for the De-
cember session by prepanng a report entitled
"The future of European defence and its demo-
cratic scrutiny 
- 
reply to the annual report of the
Council". But since then there have been a num-
ber of important developments.
3. As a result, the Presidential Committee
considered it essential for the Assembly to ex-
press its views on the impact of the new drrection
being taken in European security and defence
policy well before its ordinary session to be held
in Paris from 29 November to 2 December. It
therefore organised a special session of the As-
sembly in Luxembourg on 18-19 October on the
theme "Security and defence: the challenge for
Europe after Cologne".
4. This session, in which parliamentarians
from national foreign affairs and defence com-
mittees and a delegation from the European Parl-
iament also participated, gave rise to a yery
lively debate and concluded with the adoption by
the Standing Commiuee of Recommendation 653
and Order 108 on the basis of the report entitled
"Security and defence: the challenge for Europe
after Cologne" which your Rapporteur submitted
on behalf of the Political Committee2. The As-
sembly also adopted a Message to the Govern-
ments and Parliaments of Europe to urge them
not to abandon the project of a European com-
mon defence subject to democratic scrutiny.
5. The special session provided an opporil-
nity to highlight a number of aspects of the
problems to be resolved following the decisions
taken by the Cologne European Council, aspects
which need to be examined in more detail in this
report. The content of the first part of the 45th
annual report of the Council3 can also be taken
rnto account. Tlus is the first occasion in a long
time that the Council has transmitted its report
sufficiently early for the Assembly's committees
to be able to study and respond to it in their re-
ports. The Assembly is also gratefrrl to the
Council for the speed with which it replied to
Recommendations 644 to 652 adopted at the
June 1999 session.
6. Conversely, a reading of the Council's
reply to Recommendatiot 642 on "WEU and
European defence: beyond Amsterdam", which
was adopted by the Standing Committee on
16 March 1999, makes it is difficult to see rvhy it
did not reach the Assembly until July.
II. Cologne: was o solution found for deJining
Europe's mission and for the meosures needed
to achieve it?
7. A study of the European Council's Col-
ogne Declaration suggests that thrngs are clear: it
is the European Union's mission to become an
independent and credrble plal'er in the field of
crisis management whereas collective defence
remains the exclusive prerogative of the Atlantic
Alliance. There is no longer anytalk of framing a
cornmon defence as envisaged in the Maastncht
and Amsterdam Treaties. The statement in the
1 See Recommendation 644 orWEU after the Wash-
ington and Cologne Summits 
- 
repl-v_. to the annual
report ofthe Council.
2 See Assembly Document 7662, 19 October 1999.
3 See Assembly Document l66t.20 September 1999
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EU Presrdency report to the efFect that the
commitments under Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty wrll in any event be preserved
for the member states parf,v to the Treat_v does
not change anything in that respect.
8. This nerv dimension for the European
Union marks a fundamental change of direction
in the course the relevant governments have
mapped out since starting to pursue a Common
Foreign and Secun[- Policy' (CFSP) in the
Union. Despite major differences of view be-
tween the various political actors involved, most
European govemments, the WEU Assembh'and
the European Parliament u,ere agreed on one
point: the mutual assistance obligation should, in
one form or another, become parl of the Treaty
on European Uruon. The Assembly has ahvay's
been aware that this u,ould be a difficult process
which u,ould take trme and this rvas why it pro-
posed proceeding in stages that would culminate
rn the achievement of a common defence rvithin
the European Union. Its position on this matter
rvas perfectly consistent lrrth the plan for a series
of phases wrth a new to WEU's gradual integra-
tion into the European Union, whrch was put
forward in March 1997 by six countries at the
Intergovernmental Conference that resulted in the
Amsterdam Treaty.
9. Accordrng to some sources, the decision to
give up tryrng to make mutual assistance an obli-
gation rn the European Union, even in the form of
a separate protocol, was not merely a concession
to the refusal by the non-allied countries to enter
into a collective defence commrtment but also re-
flected concern that the incorporation of such an
obligation mrght create drfficulties in the EU's
future relations with Russia. If that is true. it
rvould be tantamountto de faclo recognition that
Russia has a say in the rvay,the EU applies the
prousions of Article l7 of the Amsterdam Treaty
which authonses the European Council to build a
common defence urthur the European Union.
10. Any argument to the effect that it is too
early to expect the European Council to take a
decrsion to that end is justifiable and rndeed the
Assembly has always maintarned that such a step
could not be taken until the very end of the pro-
cess. One could also be content nith the fact that
Article 17.i of the Amsterdam Treaty is norv in
force and that the European Umon could avail
itself of its provisions uhenever it considered it
appropnate. What is troubling is that the Col-
ogne Declaration refers only to the first part of
that arlicle and not to the second. lrhich mentions
the possibility'of a common defence.
I L All the information in our possession
rvould suggest that rvhat we are seetng is a real
shift in longer-term policy arvay from the spint
and letter of the Maastncht and Amsterdam
Treaties. The clearest proof of this uas the replr',
given in response to a questron from Mr Beh-
rendt, bv Mr Verheugen *'hen he u'as Germany's
Depu[,Minister for Forergn Affairs, in which he
said that collective defence was not artd would
not become a task for the European Union.
lZ. The Assemblv has of course taken due
note of the comments made by Mr Santer, former
President of the European Commission and
member of the European Parliament, at its spe-
cial session m Luxembourg in response to the
concerns the Assembly'had expressed about the
fact that the Fifteen are at present no longer
thinking rn terms of building a common defence
wrthin the European Union as envisaged in the
Maastncht and Amsterdam Treatiesa.
13. In this connection Mr Santer said the fol-
lou'ing:
"Having attended the European Council in
Cologne ex offuo, I must point out that
this may be misleading The members of
the European Council certainll' never in-
tended to go against the provisions of the
Maastncht or Amsterdam Treaties. On the
contrary, I do not think rve should exag-
gerate the importance of the Cologne
Declaration, especialll, since it is an rn-
tenm declaration. as you will have realised
uhen you read it. ( ) [The CFSP] was not
the marn item on the European Council's
agenda on that occasion".
14. Horvever, even though the Cologne Dec-
laration is only an mterim one, it reflects a situa-
tion that looks unlikely to change for some time
to come, as implied b1'the following comment
from Mr Lekberg (an observer from Srveden m
the WEU Assemblv and Chairman of the Euro-
a See recital fir) inthe preamble to Recommendation
653 on "securifi, and defence: the challenge for
Europe after Cologne", adopted by the Standing
Committee in Luxembourg on 19 October 1999.
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pean Af[airs Committee in the Su'edish Parlia-
ment) at the Assembll"s special session in Lux-
embourg:
"It is rmportart to clanfr the difference
betiveen cnsis management and common
defence. European Union contributions ap-
ply to peace support and the issue is not
one of creating a common defence. Su'eden
cannot therefore accept a solution in which
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty
is integrated into the European Umon".
15 Furthermore, 1n an address to the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the French National As-
sembly on 27 October 1999 in Pans. Mrs Hal-
onen, the Firmish Minister for Foreign Affairs
and representative of the Presrdencl, of the EU
Council, confirmed that:
"the member states have unanimously de-
cided to leave issues related to common
defence (Article $ outside the list of items
on the agenda''.
16 In this connection it is rvorth beanng in
mind the correlation that exists betrveen the pro-
vision of the Amsterdam Treaty that authonses
the European Councrl to decide to establish a
common defence x'ithin the European Union and
the provision authonsmg it to decide on the pos-
sibilitt' of WEU's integration into the EU. Here
again, it is interesting to note the posrilon the:
Swedish representative expressed in Lurem-
bourg:
"Finally, the question of u'hat xill happen
to Western European Union followrng Col-
ogne is of course a matter for its member
states. When it comes to the European
Union, the decision-making is absolutely
clear 
- 
accordrng to Article 17 of the Trea-
f' on European Union, the integration of
WEU into the Union is a decision u'hich
should be made b1'the European Council.
It should therefore be done rvith the fi.rll
agreement of all, and I repeat all. the mem-
ber states".
17. However. rt has become clear that the
European Council has altered the drrectron taken
in the Amsterdam Treatl', since in Cologne it
abandoned any idea of WEU's integration even
though the introduction to the Presidencv report
still refers to that possibilrtl'. Instead, the Euro-
pean Council is non'envisaging "the inclusion of
those functions of the WEU ivhich will be neces-
sary for the EU to fulfil its nex,responsibilities in
the area of the Petersberg tasks''. But most im-
portant from the political point of vierv is the fact
that in Cologne the European Council did away'
wrth the correlation betrveen thc framing of a
common defence in the European Uruon and
WEU's rntegration into the Union, rvhen it used
that puzzling phrase statrng that "WEU as all
organisation x'ould have completed its purpose"
once the European Union rvas in a position to
take responsibilitl' for Petersberg tasks.
18. According to the Agreement on the status
of WEU signed on 11May'1955, 'the Organisa-
tion" means WEU comprising the Council. its
subsidiarl'bodies and the Assembly. The Council
rvas created by virrue of Article VIII of the
modified Brussels Trealv primanl1. 'to consider
matters concerning the execution of ttus Treaty
and of its Protocols and their Annexes". It is
therefore clear that the WEU Council is respon-
sible, for instance, for the application of Article
IV governing cooperation with NATO, ffid
above all for Article V wluch concerns mutual
assistance in the event of an armed attack. It rs
also responsible for the application of Articles
VIII, IX and XI of the Treat_v, all of which con-
tinue to have fu1l effect
19. The Cologne Declaration, holever, openll'
gives the rmpression that WEU as an organisa-
tion has only one function: this concerns the exe-
cution of Petersberg tasks. to the exclusion of all
the other functions for uhich it rvas created. This
false impression is extremely dangerous because
of its considerable rmpact on political decision-
makers, who infer from it that WEU is no longer
necessary to monitor comphance wrth the com-
mitment contained in Article V. The wording of
the phrase about WEU completing its purpose is
therefore not onll' unrvise but irresponsible as
rvell. Horvever, given the area of competence of
the European Council, it is unthinkable that it
u'ould have wanted to take a decision on the issue
of hou' the relevant bodies should henceforth
appll' the provisions of the modified Brussels
Treaty, or on the future of the Trea5.. The
authoritl, of the European Council, u'hose roisrn
d'Atre is to be found exclusivelv m the Treatl' on
European Union, u,as confined to taking deci-
sions only on the mrssions that Treaty assigns to
WEU rn rts relations rvith the European Uruon.
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Under Article 17 of the Treat!', WEU's purpose
is to.
provide the European Union u'ith ac-
cess to an operational capability, and
support the Union in framrng the de-
fence aspects of the Common Foreign
and Secunty Policv.
20. In contrast, Article 17.3 puts the European
Union under an obligation to avail itself of WEU
to elaborate and implement decisions of the
Union ufuch have defence implications. The
phrase stating that "WEU as an organisation
u'ould have completed its purpose" can therefore
apply only to working relations between the EU
and WEU as descnbed in Article 17. To put an
end to WEU's purpose would require an amend-
ment to the Amsterdam Treatl. However, the
negotiations between the Frfteen are bound to be
exlremely difficult u'hen it comes to making all
the arrangements necessary for the European
Union to be capable of taking action in the field
of cnsis management without the assistance of
WEU. While France has sent its partners an ac-
tion plan proposing the creation without delay of
new bodies in the EU, and other member coun-
tries are preparing their contributions for the
implementation of the Cologne decisions, noises
are once again comrng from NATO rvarnrng
Europeans about the danger of creating struc-
tures parallel to those of NATO. ln view of this
srtuation one may wonder what pushed the heads
of state and government of the Fifteen into in-
cludrng in a public declaration a hypothetical
phrase about the completion of WEU's purpose,
especially when it is usual practice in politics for
most governments not to reply, and nghtly so, to
hyp othetical questions.
2).. In any event the phrase m question is giv-
ing nse to all sorts of misunderstanding not only
in public oprnion but also in political circles. But
even more seriously, it is causing great darnage
to the cause of European secunty instead of
helping to strengthen it, whereas this should be
the ambition of all the interested parties.
22. Should the Assembly accept the new dir-
ection taken by the European Council? Those
who consider that Europe no longer needs to
concern itself wrth collective defence are grorving
in number. If that vierv were justified, on the ba-
sis of an assessment rulurg out any likelihood in
practice of a threat to the territonal rntegntl, of
member countries in the foreseeable future, tt
may u'ell be acceptable to retarn Article V, which
would exrst alongside the European Union, rvith-
out being concerned about who might oversee its
application. One school of thought is that it
would be sufficient for the govemments to hon-
our their commitments as members of the Atlan-
tic Alliance. But such an approach would have
very far-reaching consequences for the objective
of European construction, which u,ould as a re-
sult remarn unfimshed in terms of defence and
rvould continue to leave Europe dependent on the
goodwill of the United States in this particular
area. There are some x'ho rvant such a situation
to continue but your Rapporteur considers that
the Assemblv, as guardian of the modified Brus-
sels TreaW, cannot advocate tlus as the proper
course ofaction since it does not seem appropn-
ate for strengthening European security, which
was one of the main reasons for the creation of
WEU.
23. The Assembly should therefore continue to
support 
- 
as rt did wrth its Plan for Action 
- 
a
policy designed to mainta:n Europe's collective
defence commitment as part of the objective of
European construction, ensuring that it is fully
complementary to the transatlantic commiunent
in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty 
-
as stipulated rn the Amsterdam Treaty. It would
be unacceptable if a minority of nerv European
Union members were able at the end of the day to
make the majority pursue a course different to
the one to which thev subscnbed by becoming
members of the Union.
24. The European Union's objective in secu-
nty and defence matters rvill have to be clanfied
before it enlarges further. It is already to be
feared that countries seeking membership are
receiving the wrong message about what awaits
them in this area as a result of the Cologne Dec-
laration.
25. For as long as the project for achieving a
common defence in the European Union remains
in abeyance, WEU will continue to be vitalll,
important and its Council should continue to take
fuIl responsibility for the application of Article V
and the other provisions of the modified Brussels
Treaty rvhich are in force. To that end it is es-
sential for WEU, as an organisation, to continue
its work.
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26. As regards achieving the European
Council's ambitions of providrng the European
Uruon with a capacrt-v for action to lead crisis-
management tasks as defined in the Amsterdam
Treaty, it should be remembered that the run-up
to the Cologne Summit sarv a number of different
approaches as to the most appropriate way of
attaining ths obj ective.
27. Some countries notably the United
Kingdom 
- 
took the view that the main problem
was how to strengthen military capabilities and
that institutional issues should not be the top pn-
onty. In the Cologne texts the word "capability"
appears no less that 19 times (!) in the English
version but it is interesting to note that it is used
in different contexts. There are references to
military-, operational or, more generally, defence
capabilities as well as to a capacit-v for action,
which implies improving the decision-making
process ur times of cnsis.
28. The Cologne documents, a substantial part
of which are devoted to the latter problem, pro-
pose as a solution setting up cerLain bodies
*rthrn the European Union to ensure the political
control and strategic direction of EU-led Peters-
berg operations so that the Union can at the same
time decide on and conduct such operations ef-
fectively.
29. In order to generate this capacrty for ac-
tion, the European Council envisages inter aha'.
regular (or ad hoc) meettngs of the
General Affairs Council, as appropriate
including Defence Ministers;
a permanent body rn Brussels (Political
and Security Commiuee) consistrng of
representatives wrth politico-military
expertise;
an EU Military Committee consisting
of military representatives making re-
commendations to the Political and Se-
curiry Committee,
an EU Military Staff including a
Situation Centre;
other resources such as a Satellite
Centre, Institute for Securitv Studies.
The Cologne Declaration does not mention the
problem of democratic scrutiny but acknow-
ledges that "firrther institutional queshons may
need to be addressed".
30. ln choosing this approach for improving
the EU's decision-making capacrty, the European
Council has reopened the question of institutional
reforms which, as experience has long shown, are
particularly difficult to achieve. A closer look at
these proposals makes it clear that the European
Union is planmng to create bodies that already
exist rn a srmrlar form in WEU.
31. But before studying the Cologne Declara-
tion in more detail, there is a fundamental polrt
to be clanfied with the WEU Council: the Euro-
pean Council tasked the EU General Affairs
Council to prepare the institutional decisions that
are to be taken by the end of the year 2000. Go-
lng on information the Assembly has received
from the WEU Presidency and Secretary-Gen-
eral, the view in WEU is that the Assembly is not
involved in the institutional debate even though it
directly concerns its future. Accordrng to the
same sources, the only task remaining for WEU
is for it to concem itself n{th enhancing the leg-
acy it rvill one day wish to transfer to the Euro-
pean Union.
32. Your Rapporteur is convinced that there is
nothing in the Cologne Declaration to prevent
WEU, and in particular its Assembly, from
submitting appropriate proposals to the Euro-
pean Union for achievrng the arnbitions the Un-
ion has set in an area rvhich, after all, is the re-
sponsibiliry of WEU. On the contrary, there is all
the more justification for tlunking that all WEU
bodies should take part in the general debate that
is only beginning now that the basic decisions
have been taken by the European Council. WEU,
as an integral part of the development of the EU,
is responsible for implementing the obligations
stemming from the modified Brussels Treatv and
cannot be left on the sidelines. This being so, the
Assembly cannot urge the Council too strongly to
cast off the passive auitude which it has a ten-
dency to adopt and which, moreover, conflicts
rvith its stated intention to pursue its informal
refleoion on the future of security and defence
Europe. What is the point of such reflection if rt
does not lead to concrete proposals?
33. If it is the Council's concern, and one that
is rvholly shared by the Assembly, to transfer to
the European Union a defence culture that is
lackrng in the institutions at 15, it must do a
great deal more than enhance WEU's legacy. The
Fifteen will never acquire that culture in those
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institutions if thel' are left to make the necessary
preparations on their own for taking on tasks in
an area in which they still have little experience.
31. Regarding the measures to be taken so that
the European Union can assume its new respon-
sibilities, agreement w-ill first have to be reached
on the correct interpretatron to be given to the
proposals made by the EU Presidency'. As for the
arrangements to be made for providrng the
sources necessary for military decision-makrng, it
would appear that as far as the instruments are
concerned in areas such as situation analysis,
intelligence and strategic planning, the EU Presi-
dency chose wording that wrll make it possible to
transfer the relevant WEU bodies to the Euro-
pean Umon. Thrs could apply to the Military
Committee, Militarl' Staff, Situation Centre, Sat-
ellite Centre and/or Institute for Secunq. Studies
even though the Cologne document does not
specifically mention '.'WEU" in this conte*.
35. If the Cologne proposals rvere interpreted
in that way, it q'ould be tantamount to an incor-
poration of those bodies rnto the European
Union. They would then be in perfect harmony
uith both the Amsterdam Treaty' and the As-
sembll"s Plan for Action uhich among other
thrngs suggests that the rvav forward is to "build
a defence instrument in the European Uruon by
drawrng on what already exists". The problem
that mll arise following such a transfer is how to
involve the representatives of the associate mem-
ber and associate partner countries in vierv ofthe
fact that they currentll,participate in the rvork of
the vanous WEU bodies.
36. Things are more complicated when it
comes to the political decision-making bodies in
the EU. There is a hnk betu'een the proposal to
hold meetings of a General Affairs Council also
deahng rvith security issues and the creation of
new structures intended to replace those currently
existing in WEU, namely the Council of Minis-
ters and the Permanent Council. But in Recom-
mendalon 642 andthe Plan for Action it adopted
on 16 March this 1,ear, the Assembly proposed
pursuing the course mapped out in the Amster-
dam Treatv and making preparations for the
gradual integration of all WEU's functions rnto
the European Union 
- 
the first step being to place
WEU under the authoriq, of the European
Councrl.
37. The procedures the Assembly proposed
rvould have made it possible for the WEU Coun-
cil to be directly' answerable to the European
Council and would have avoided the need to
create new decision-making bodres witlun the
EU. The Assembly's approach also fits in with
the rationale of giving Mr Solana a dual remit as
High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary-
General of WEU, utlch is now the most likely
scenario.
38. The question is rvhether the way forward
proposed in Cologne is really the last word on the
matter or whether Cologne was merely the pre-
lude to an institutional debate that has only just
begun. ln view of the proposals France has
submitted on this matter, it would appear that the
debate is wide open and no solutron has been
ruled out yet. It is therefore important to take on
board the fact that, in spite of the Cologne Decla-
ration, some member goverrunents have not given
up the idea of integrating WEU into the Euro-
pean Uruon, as envisaged in the Amsterdam
Treatys.
39. Nevertheless, the action plan President
Chirac sent the EU member states in late July
does appear to go in the direction drscussed in
Cologne and even goes further in that France is
proposing to its partners that the Political and
Secunty Committee (COPS) and the Military
Commrttee should be set up in parallel to Mr
Solana taking office as Secretary-General of the
EU Council and High Representative for the
CFSP. France's proposal is that Mr Solana
should chair the COPS, which u'ould take on the
role currently assigned to the Political Committee
for which provision is made in Article 25 of the
Amsterdam Treaty.
40. The French action plan also proposes that
the COPS rvould be made up of Permanent Rep-
resentatives holding the rank of ambassador but
who would not be the Permanent Representa-
fives to the North Allantic Counul. France is
therefore not rn favour of EUA{ATO "double-
5 See for instance the address the German Chan-
cellor, Gerhard Schrdder, gave to the German for-
eign affairs association in Berlin on 2 September
1999. In an address on 22 October in Paris to the
Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale, the
French Pnme Minister, Mr Jospin, spoke in favour
of integrating WEU rn the European Uniot and
transferring its functions to the EU.
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hatting" in the COPS, as is currently the case for
some members of the WEU Permanent Council
vis-ir-vis NATO. In contrast the French proposal
does not exclude double-hatting for members of
the Military Committee. Pendrng the establish-
ment of a militar1, staff, for wluch the Cologne
Summit also made provision, France suggests
that for a transitional period the COPS should
draw on the resources of the WEU Milrtarl,
Staff.
41. The COPS would also be responsible for
managing all matters concerning the CFSP in-
cludrng those with defence rmplications. Under
the Council's authority it would also ensure the
political control and strategic direction of EU-led
operations. But to begin with its main task would
be to propose solutions for:
the inclusion of WEU functions in the
European Union:
the rnvolvement and participation of
WEU associate members and associate
parhers in the European Union's new
missions:
relations betrveen the European Union
andNATO.
42. Despite the reservations of countries such
as Italy and the Netherlands about achieving
Europe's ambition of havrng a crisis-manage-
ment capabilrty that is wholly autonomous vis-i-
vis the United States and NATO, it would seem
that a broad consensus is emerging about the
need to set up a high-level Permanent Committee
invested wlth authority' for the political control
and strategic direction of Petersberg mrssions.
43. Most member states consider that the
Treaty on European Union will have to be re-
vised to give such a committee the necessary
powers. They are in broad agreement that it
should have competence for all matters under the
CFSP, which primarily covers non-military as-
pects, and that a single institutional framework
should be maintarned for any action.
44. ln this connection it is important to note
that the WEU Council (srnce Bremen) and the
European Council (since Cologne) are lookrng to
establish a common European security and de-
fence policy (ESDP) which they have yet to drf-
ferentiate clearly from the CFSP as defined in the
Amsterdam Treatl'. Holever, it car be inferred
from the context in which this nerv term is being
used, that the ESDP rvill encompass the rvhole
range of Petersberg missions rvhile not being
confined to them. However it is defined. the
ESDP covers activities rvhich the European Un-
ion can at present undertake only bv havurg re-
course to WEU and for u'hich in future it rvill
have to take sole responsibilitv.
45. Accordmg to proposals submitted by
France and endorsed by Germany in the form of
a joint letter of 13 October 1999 from Mr Chirac
and Mr Schroder to the Firurish Presidency of the
European Union, Mr Solana 
- 
the new Secretary-
General of the EU Council and High Represen-
tative for the CFSP 
- 
should chair the Political
and Securit-v Commrttee (COPS) that is to be set
up. However, this suggestion was not approved
by the Fifteen at their informal summit in Tam-
pere on 15-16 October, since it rvould mean a
deparhrre from the pnnciple of rotating commit-
tee charrmanship by u,hich the smaller member
states set great store. They fear that if the1,
agreed to the new arrargement, they rvould have
even less rnfluence than they do at present.
46. Given that creation of the COPS would
requrre a revision of the Treaties and that a trme-
frame rvould have to be set for completing the
necessary ratification process, the majonty' of
member states appear to favour an rntenm solu-
tion compatible with the existing texts, u'hich the
heads of state and government could agree at
their nerl summit meeting on 10-11 December
1999 in Helsinki. The main task of an interim
committee in Brussels should be to make ar-
rangements for implementing the decisions taken
b1'the Cologne European Council.
47. It would appear that differences have come
to light about certain details regardrng matters
such as the COPS' relations with COREPER and
the European Commission, double-hatting and so
on. Where there is unlikely to be unanlmous
agreement among the Fifteen is on the French
proposal to create an EU body rvhich would be
roughly equivalent to the permanent North At-
lantic Council and drrectlv ansrverable to the EU
Council.
48. Another problem to be settled concems the
participation of defence mhisters in future work
of the General Affairs Council on the CFSP, to
whrch the ESDP u'ould add a further dimension.
Some countries consider that the model used in
11
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WEU, with foreign affairs and defence ministers
holding joint meetings, has not proved a success
and they x'ould therefore prefer to see ministers
holdurg separate meeturgs according to their port-
folios, as is customary in NATO.
49. Then there is a need to work out affange-
ments for setting up an EU mrlitarv committee.
q,hich Srveden would prefer to call a "Petersberg
Commrttee", and integratlng a mrhtarv staff in
the EU Council General Secretanat. A study of
the most appropnate intenm solutions is also
necessary. Some countnes are in favour of ad-
opting the WEU model without going so far as
envisaging a wholesale transfer of its various
bodres to the European Union.
50. As the Fifteen have stated their determina-
tion that the objectives set in Cologne should at
all costs be achieved in the single framework of
the CFSP, the EU member states have embarked
on a fairly complex institutional debate rvhich is
unlikely to produce results quickly. But the in-
terim arrangements will also give rise to consid-
erable problems as it will be particularly difficult
to find appropriate and acceptable solutions for
WEU's associate members to participate rn any
future cnsis-management action the European
Union takes. On this point y'our Rapporteur full1'
shares the position the WEU Secretary-General
expressed on 19 October 1999 in his address to
the Assembly's special session rn Luxembourg
rvhen he said: "I believe it rvould be simplistic to
thrnk that tlus only entails avoiding potential ob-
stacles to good relations rvith NATO, where
these countries have an equal say to other Euro-
peans. No 
- 
something qurte different is at stake.
The European Union has to demonstrate that it is
ready to cooperate wrth other players in its en-
deavours to develop European security". It will
be remembered that two possibilities are open to
the EU:
- 
it can either carry out operations q.ith
the support of the Atlantic Alliance,
usrng the latter's assets, or
it can carry out operations on its own.
51. The first possibilitl' rs closelv linked to the
decision taken by the Atlantic Alliance at the
Washington Summit in Apnl this year on the
establishment of direct relations between NATO
and the European Union. It rvas there that the
Alliance declared for the first time that it was
read)'to "define and adopt the necessary ar-
rangements for ready access by the European
Union to the collective assets and capabilitres of
the Alliance, for operations in rvhich the Alliance
as a rvhole r not engaged mrlitanly ...".
52. The ongin of the arangements that rvere
finally agreed in Washington goes back to Berlin
in 1996 rvhen the Alliance took the decision to
allorv WEU to have recourse to Alliance assets
for operations under the political control and
strategic direction of the WEU Council. It was in
Waslungton that an agreement was finalised be-
bveen WEU and NATO on a framework docu-
ment for making Alliance assets available to
WEU
53. As things stand, this arrangement enables
WEU associate members to be firlly rnvolved
from the outset in a WEU-led crisis-management
operation using Alliance assets. ln other words,
for as long as WEU is responsible for conducting
such an operation, all the associate members take
part in it on w'hat is virnrally an equal footing
rvith full members. The countries concerned are
Iceland, Nonval', Turkey, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland.
54. However, this might no longer be the case
once the Alliance starts deahng with the Euro-
pean Union:
(a) the WEU associate members fear that
therr effectrve "operational" status will be
weakened: as they are not members of the
EU, they wrll no longer be able, as they
are in WEU, to be rnvolved from the be-
giruring in European decisions; this could
lead to a future arangement with the Alli-
ance in which the EU rvould have recourse
to NATO assets and capabilities x,hich
also belong to the non-EU members of the
Alliance;
(b) where WEU requests such recourse to
NATO assets, those non-EU members of
the Alliance will be involved from the be-
ginning in the decision to make such a re-
quest and will therefore have no reason to
block it in the Alliance. However, follorv-
ing Waslungton and Cologne, it rvould
seem that their participation in the initial
decision is no longer assured, since it will
become a CFSP decision to be taken
uithin the European Union;
t2
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k) if, in a specific cnsis, the associate
members disagree wrth the EU havrng re-
course to Alliance 
- 
hence also their 
- 
as-
sets, the only place in which they will be
able to state their objections will be within
the Alliance itself, where it wrll be much
more difficult and politically delicate to
take a lone decision or break with a con-
sensus than is currently the case within
WEU;
(d) the pill is made even harder to swal-
low by the fact that those EU members
wluch are not members of the Alliance,
and whose observer status withrn WEU for
cnsis-management operations is consid-
erably less favourable than that of the as-
sociate members, will now be able to par-
ticipate fully and on an equal footrng in all
"European" decisions wluch could lead to
an EU request to use Alliance assets.
55. The Cologne decisions will therefore result
in a considerable shift of balance between the
current WEU associate members and observers
in favour of the latter in terms of the weight they
bring to bear in the decision-making process.
However, it should not be forgotten that the
Washington Communique attaches the utmost
importance to ensunng "the fullest possible in-
volvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led
crisis-response operations, building on existing
consultation arrangements u.ithin the WEU".
56. Furthermore, the Washington Commu-
nique tasked the Council in Permanent Session to
"address these measures on an ongorng basis,
takrng into account the evolution of relevant ar-
rangements in the EU". This shou's that the Alli-
ance did not write a blank cheque. lndeed the
NAC was to "make recommendations to the next
ministerial meeting for its consideration". Thus,
the last word on the matter has by no means been
sard. It remains to be seen whether the European
Union will have to adjust to NATO's rules and
whether NATO rvill henceforth have to adapt to
developments in the EU.
57. The Europeal Council's Cologne Declar-
ation envrsages that all EU member states, re-
gardless of rvhether or not they are members of
NATO, will be able to participate fully and on an
equal footing rn EU operations. In respect ofnon-
EU allies and partners, the Declaration says ar-
rangements will be put in place to allorv them to
take part in crisis-management operations to the
fullest possible extent. Thus the Declaration
draws no distinction at a1l between WEU's cur-
rent associate members and its associate part-
ners, rvhereas in WEU's ministerial organs a
clear distinction ls made between them, particu-
larly with regard to operations or missions.
58. It is therefore understandable that the
terms of the Cologne Declaration, wluch put
WEU associate member and associate partner
countries on a virtually equal footing, should
have been viewed wrth distrust by the associate
members. Such distrust pervaded the atmosphere
during work in the Alliance and WEU on "Berlin
plus".
59. However, it has to be said that the German
Presidency's report, which is part of the Cologne
Declaration, considerably' qualifies the language
used in the Declaration itself. Indeed, that report
states that '-the successful creation of a European
policy on security, and defence wrll require (...)
satisfactory arangements for European NATO
members who are not EU member states to en-
sure their firllest possible involvement in EU-led
operations, building on exrsting consultation ar-
rangements within'WEU".
60. The terms used in Washington: "fullest
possible involvement" and Cologne: "take part to
the fullest possible exlent" do not mean exactly
the same thing. The countries concerned are
therefore rvary and prepared to seize every op-
portunit_v to ensure that the institutional decisions
to be taken eventually by the Union are as much
in line as possible with the language used in
Washington, everlthing it imphed and the expec-
tations it has given rise to, or even confirmed.
This problem is a major part of q'hat is com-
monly called WEU's acquis.
61. In this connection it is worth refernng
back to the concems expressed in Mr Baumel's
report on "WEU after the Washington and Col-
ogne Summits" in which the Rapporteur said that
neither the Washington nor the Cologne formula
contained a guarantee to the effect that the coun-
tries in question would preserve all the rights of
participation they currenfly enloy in the WEU
Council, its subsidiary bodies and the Assembly.
It is therefore up to the Council and the Assem-
bly to make strong representations to the Euro-
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pean Union to ensure that tlus rmportant WEU
acquis is preserved
62. This problem also concerns the second
possibilit)' the EU has for operations that could
be carried out under its responsibility, namelv
those it could now undertake on its own x'ithout
having recourse to Alliance assets. Until norv the
associate members have been part)' to arrange-
ments gor erning their participation in operations
undertaken independentll, bv WEU.
63. On this point it is lvorth referring back to
the Declaration of the WEU Council of Mrmsters
of 22 JrtJy 1997, which is an integral part of the
Amsterdam Treatv since it is attached to the
Final Act adopted b1'the Intergovernmental Con-
ference of the fifteen EU member statos in Am-
sterdam on 2 October 1997. Accordrng to that
Declaration. and w'ith reference to operations
carried out autonomously or usrng NATO assets
and capabilities, "associate members take part on
the same basis as full members in operations to
which the1, contnbute, as rvell as in relevant ex-
ercises and planning". Fufthermore, the Declar-
ation says that WEU rrrll also "examine ... the
possibilities for maximum participation rn rts
activities bv associate members ... in accordance
with their status".
64. Holever, it can generally be said that the
nerv formula proposed by, the European Council
x'ill result in a substantial enhancement of the
po\\'ers and rights of WEU observer countries
compared to those of the associate members. But
it would be odd if that w'ere to lead to a situation
in which countries refusrng to subscribe to col-
lective defence rvere relarded s,hrle those com-
miued to it or prepared to enter into such a
commitment were penalised. That is why it is
absolutely' essential to find a solution that treats
the latter category of countries farrly. Accordrng
to unofficial information, discussions on the fu-
ture Ueatment of associate members are alreadl,
under rvay. It rvould appear that some members
are seeking to improve those counties' acqurs
within WEU pnor to the transfer of the Organi-
sation's functions to the European Union, where-
as others would prefer to see them reduced. Some
people even think that the associate members
should henceforth be content n'ith a status in the
EU similar to that currentlv held bv the observ-er
countries in WEU.
65 In thrs connection it is appropriate to re-
call. as Mr Guido Lenzi did u,hen speakurg at a
conference in Stockholm on 29 September 1999
as the then Director of the Instrtute for Secunw
Studies. that:
"As far back as 1994, the then foreign
ministers of Itall' and the United Krngdom.
Mr Andreatta and Mr Hurd, referred to the
need to invite non-EU countnes to con-
tribute to emerging "second pillar" activi-
ties rvell before thev could meet the much
more stringent "first pillar" criteria. Wrth
the entrv into force ofthe provisions ofthe
Amsterdam Treaty, the issue has become
even more relevant".
66. It should also be remembered that the As-
sembly produced a number of reports and re-
commendations on this subject6. But it norv looks
hrghly unlikelv that the EU member states are
prepared to take the WEU model for participa-
tion by the assocrate members and transpose it as
such to the European Union. In any event they
are not going to agree to those countries being
involved in the CFSP on a general basis. Nerther
is there anv reason to thmk they rvill agree to
them taking part in meetings of the General Af-
farrs Council or the COPS rn the same way as
they currently attend meetrngs of the WEU
Council of Mimsters and Permanent Council.
67. In vierv of the fact that the EU member
states are determrned to continue to rvork rvithin
the configuration of the Fifteen, all that can be
hoped for at the present stage is that the associate
member countries will be allorved to participate,
possibl1, on at ad hoc basis, rn meetings of the
COPS as soon as the EU starts making prepara-
tions to take a decision on carryrng out a Peters-
berg mrssion in the framervork of the ESDP.
Problems will also arise when it comes to rl'ork-
ing out the practical arrangements for staff from
such countries to take part in the European
Military Staff.
68. It is also reported that the possrbrlrfl, is
being studied of establishing relations betrveen
the European Uruon and the countnes concerned
along the lines of Schengen, b1, creating joint
commrttees lvluch could meet on an ad hoc basis
as soon as a specific crisis arose. However, grven
6 See Recommendation 626 ot "securitl in a wider
Europe 
- 
repl1'to the annual report ofthe Council",
adopted on 18 Ma1' 1998.
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that such a systcm rvouid concern bilateral rcla-
tions onl1,, it u'ould constitute a step backwards
compared to the nghts the associate membcrs
havc acquired in WEU. Turkcy rn particular is
said to have made it quite clear to the European
Union that it wishes to maintain the status it en-
joys inWEU.
69. The problem of the future role of WEU's
associate parhers rvhen the European Union
takes responsibility for the rvhole question of
managing crises merits special attention. The
Assembly will be lookrng into this matter in a
report to be submiued on behalf of the Political
Commiuee by Mr Martinez Casafl and Mr Han-
cock. For the time being your Rapporteur will
confine himself to pomtmg out that the EU Presi-
dency report adopted by the Cologne European
Council does no more than offer the seven coun-
tries concerned a study of ways to enable them to
parlicipate in EU action, rvithout even taliing as a
basis the arrangements currently made for them
rn WEU. Moreover, the EU governments do not
appear to want to give any pnority to solving this
particular problern.
'10. One idea being floated is that an arrange-
ment similar to the Partnership for Peace might
suffice but there again it would only concern bi-
lateral relations with the countries concerned and
this rvould clearly amount to a watering donn of
the righa the associate parmers enjoy in WEU. It
can be seen from all tlnt has been said that,
notrvithstandrng the majority view according to
which institutional matters are easier to settle
than the problem ofhorv to strengthen European
military capabilities, the insututional path map-
ped out by the European Council has so many
rmplications tlrat one ma1'u'ell ask rvhsther the
underlf ing objective of improving the decision-
maling procedure in Europe, could not be ach-
ieved by takrng a less complicated approach.
7 | . There is no doubt that one of the intentions
of those who drafted the Cologne Declaratron
was to srnplify the process of buildrng Europe
by reducing the number of organisations. A tlpi-
cal example of this approach can be seen in the
comments made by Mr Schalping, thc German
Mrnister for Defence, at the press conference
given at the close of the WEU Ministerial Coun-
cil meeting in Bremen on 10-11 May 1999, n'hen
he sard there were 'too many institutions and too
Iittle action". It rvas clear that the urstitution the
Minister had rn mtnd rvas \\lEU as berng onc
organisatron too many'. Such statements always
go dorvn u,cll urth public opiruon, whrch fails to
recognise that sccuntv and defence decistons are
not taken by the institutions as such but rather by,
the member governments. In fact the uxtitutions
are a reflection of the progress Europeans have
made so far rn cooperation in various areas.
Besides which, it is not WEU as an organisation
which is preventrng the mcmber governments
from taking the necessary decisions.
72. On this point your Rapporteur agrees rvith
Mr Barnier, the European Commissioner re-
sponsible for reform of the irutitutions, who has
expressed the vierv that one should "beware of
those who argue in favow of a simple Europe,
because that would mcan a uniform Europe. A
certain degree of complexitl' has to be both ac-
cepted and advocated"T.
73. ln the case of VIEU, it has succeeded in
b.t gg together 28 European counries through
very close cooperation on security and defence
matters, and i6 of thern 
- 
ten firll members and
six associate members 
- 
are already rvholly
commiued to collectlve defence, whether this bc
in WEU and NATO, or solely in NATO. Seven
central and eastem European countries which are
currently associate partners in WEU are pre-
pared to take part unreservedly in all aspects of
Europe's security and defence system. But be-
cause of the restrictions the member countries
themselves laid doxn in WEU's enlargement
policy (even though they rvere under no obliga-
tion to do so under the modified Brussels Trea-
ty), they lct slip the oppornrniti'to give Europe a
security and defence dimension u"ithin the frame-
work of WEU without warting for completion of
the extremely length1, and complex process of EU
and/or NATO enlargement.
74. The positron rn the European Union, horv-
ever, is different. Because of its membership, the
Union 
- 
which includes five countries that still
have fundamental reservations about an EU se-
curity and defence dimension 
- 
continues to ex-
perience great difficulty in implementing a Com-
mon Foreign and Secunty Policy (CFSP). There
are tlree rcasons u'hv Europe has so far been
incapablc of taking action.
15
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- 
the first is that the EU member gov-
emments do not want WEU to act
without a prior decision by the EU in
the context of the CFSP;
- 
the second is that the European Umon
is not capable of taking the appropriate
decisions: and
- 
the third is that each time a crisrs be-
gins to emerge, it rvould seem that the
majonty of governments prefer to act
through the urtermediary of NATO,
ufuch alone up till now has proved that
it has a proper decision-makmg cap-
abilrty and the means to take effective
action. If Mr Scharping's comments
are justified, it would be logical to
leave all securitl, and defence problems,
including cnsis management, exclu-
sively to NATO although this is not the
objective beurg pursued by the Fifteen.
75. The British Government's change of atti-
tude in favour of a policl, designed to make the
European Union capable of taking action in the
field of cnsis management does not alter its fun-
damental reservations about any prospect of a
common defence or "European army". In fact its
effect is to bring the United Kingdom's position
closer to that of the non-allied countries in the
EU even though their arguments are very differ-
ent.
76. This situation has therefore led to a new
policv in the EU, wluch is trying to find a solu-
tion in the rapid dismemberment of WEU and its
functions. But such an approach may well not
only weaken the basis of collective securitl. but
also create new drviding lines across Europe.
III. The conditions to be met for
giving proper effect to the Cologne project
77. If the Cologne documents are taken as a
starting pornt, they can be built on to develop a
prograrnme that will achieve the objective berng
sought. One of the main consequences of the
European Council's projec! which is the logical
sequel to the decisions taken by the Atlantic Alli-
ance in Washington, is that WEU wrll cease to be
an important bridge betrveen the European Union
and NATO and that those trvo organisatrons wrll
establish direct workrng relations. This means
they will need to rvork out and implement spe-
cific arrangements. particularlv for srtuations rn
wluch the EU rvishes to conduct operations using
NATO assets and capabilities, rvhere the practi-
cal arrangements still have to be decided.
78. But u'hat is important is the need to ensure
that fruitful political cooperation in a general
sense develops betrveen the EU and NATO,
rrhose cultures and working methods are very
different. With this rn mind the Atlantic Alliance
chose the follouing wording in Washington: ''...
NATO and the EU should ensure the develop-
ment of effective mutual consultation, coopera-
tion and transparency. burldrng on the mecha-
msms existing betrveen NATO and the WEU".
On the European Union side, however, it is not
the Cologne Declaration proper but the Presi-
dency report attached to it which stresses "the
need to ensrue the del'elopment of effective mu-
tual consultation. cooperation and transparency
bets.een NATO and the EU".
79. Although it is true that the wording used
by the German Presidency is virtually identical to
that contained rn the Washington Communiqu6, it
does not mention NATO's desire to build on the
arrangements that already exist between it and
WEU in the context of its relations rvith the EU.
It is of course too early to delve further into the
details, uhich wrll have to be negotiated betrveen
NATO and the European Uruon. Because EU
members include non-allied countries, special ar-
rangements will have to be made for them to
have access to confidential documents and to
participate on an equal footing in military plan-
ning
80. Some anall,sts tlunk that the EU wished to
avoid being obliged to put its relations urth the
Atlantic Alliance on the same technical level as
those s'luch currently exist betrveen WEU and
NATO: "But nhat the European Union rvants is
to operate on a political level u'here the militarv
factors are onlv one component in decision-mak-
ing alongside political and economic aspects"8.
81. If this assessment is correct, it is important
to grasp the sigruficance, for transatlantic rela-
tions in general and relatrons between the Euro-
pean Union and the United States in particular,
8 See Jacques Walch
ington and Cologne"
1999.
"Defence Europe after Wash-
in Difense nafionale, 25 June
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of the far greater repercussions that will result
from the EU takurg over WEU functions. When
it comes to international trade, the European
Umon and the United States are competitors
rather than partners. As we saw recently, certain
conflicts in trading interests senously damaged
relations between them Up till norv, securiq' and
defence matters have not been affected by
transatlantic tussles over trade because they have
been the exclusive prerogative of NATO and
WEU
82. But even if one looks at secunt-v and de-
fence policy alone, leavtng other considerations
aside, there are some w'ho think that transferring
WEU's functrons to the European Union will put
such pressure on a European security policy to
rvork successfully that it could become an urgent
pnonty and European structures could grorv in
stature compared with transatlantic structures.
The US desrre to influence the European deci-
sion-malong process could also grow in response
to Amencan fears about the formation of a
European "caucus". Handling transatlantic rela-
tions in the absence of the bridge provided by
WEU would therefore require a great deal of
diplomac1,e.
83. One of the importarrt questions the Euro-
pean Union rull have to settle wrth NATO is horv
the EU intends to acquire the capacity for
autonomous action in the ways descnbed in
paragraph 2 of the Cologne Declaration, and horv
this will fit in with the efforts the Atlantic Alli-
ance is to make in vieu' of the fact that the gov-
ernments of the 19 NATO member countries re-
cently adopted a vast programme of new mis-
sions for NATO rn the field of crisis manage-
ment, which some of them consider should be the
main tasks of the 'herv" NATOlo. So that it can
take on these responsibilrties, which supplement
those of collective defence, the Washington
Summit adopted a defence capabilities rrutiative
containing a uhole senes of measures the mem-
ber countries are to take in the NATO frame-
work. Nothing comparable can be done on the
e See also Matthias Dembinski: ''The strain on se-
curity policy relatrons between European and trans-
atlantic structures" in HSFK Report, 111999.
10 See the address given by the German Chancellor,
Gerhard Schroder, to the German foreign affairs
association in Berltn on 2 September 1999.
European side until WEU completes the second
phase of the audit of assets and capabilities
available for European-led operations, which
could lead to agreement being reached on the
measures needed to strenglhen them.
84. If Europeans are not prepared to make an
effort in their own military budgets, the likely'
outcome is that the tntentions announced in Col-
ogne will go no further than that. It is for this
reason that the United Kingdom and Italy agreed,
at a bilateral summit held on 19-20 July this
year, to propose to their European partners the
launch of a European defence capabilities initia-
tive.
85. Refemng to the objectives set by the Col-
ogne European Council, the United Kingdom and
Italy therefore propose to set cnteria for im-
proved and strengthened European defence cap-
abilities and effective performance, to be dis-
cussed and agreed at the Luxembourg WEU
mrnisterial meetrng and the Helsinki European
Council before the end of the year. Tlus ap-
proach will include a timetable to achieve, inter
aha, the follorving:
"European-uide goals for enhanced
military capabilities to undertake crisis
management, including peacemaking,
national capabilitv objectives to ach-
ieve this European aim".
Although it would appear that the idea of defin-
ing "convergence cnteria", a concept that was
applied in the creation ofthe single currency, has
not been discussed in detail among the Fifteen, it
is an essential requirement for giving more
credibilrtl'to the European Union's stated inten-
tions.
86. Contrnuing and effective political rmpetus
in the field of armaments is another such re-
quirement. The Cologne Declaration recognises
the need for closer industnal cooperation, the
harmonisauon of military requirements, and the
planning and procurement of arms by the mem-
ber states, but does not say rvho should be given
responsibilrty for providing the impetus. In this
connection the problem of the future place and
role of WEAG and the question of its member-
ship is taking on increasing relevance. These is-
sues are dealt rvith in detarl in the report on
"Armaments cooperation in the future construc-
tion of defence in Europe", to be submiued by
t7
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Mr O'Hara on behalf of the Technological and
Aerospace Committee.
87. From the political angle, your Rapporteur
would stress the importance of Mr O'Hara's re-
port and consrders it important to highlight the
following points:
- 
the decision taken by the WEAG de-
fence ministers in November 1997 to
open the Group's activities to any in-
terested WEU observer and associate
partner countnes;
the agreement of principle whereby the
observers and new associate members
are accorded the status of fi.rll member
in WEAG;
the need for a forum with a political
drmension that would be under the di-
rection of the relevant defence ministers
and open to all European countries in-
volv'ed in the development of the Euro-
pean Secunty and Defence Identit_v
(ESDD
88. ln this respect, it is particularly important
to ensure that it is the political forum in question,
operating in an intergovernmental framework,
which takes decisions concerning militarl. re-
quirements and the planrung and procurement of
arms, and also issues invitations to tender to the
defence industry. ln its current form WEAG is
perfect for carrying out this task, wlule the Euro-
pean Commission plays an imporfant role in
strengtherung rndustrial cooperation.
89. Anv plan to transfer responsibility for ar-
maments cooperation to the European Union
must take on board the following criteria:
decisions concerning military require-
ments must be taken under the EU's
intergovernmental pillar;
care must be taken to ensure that
WEAG firll members c€ur continue to
enjoy all their current rights in the
event of such a transfer to a new insti-
tutional structure.
90. Given that WEAO is a subsidiary body of
the WEU Council rvithin the meaning of Article
VIII.2 of the modified Brussels Treaty, its future
place and remit are part of the more general
problem of deciding uhat is to become of the
exrsting treaties and institutrons if the govern-
ments continue to follow the path mapped out in
the Cologne Declaration. Under the Amsterdam
Treaty, u'hich only recentlv entered into force, it
seems clear that the signatorv states can create
new bodies without berng obliged to amend the
Treaty.
91. But the Treaty has to be amended if:
(a) the EU rntends to change the decision-
making procedure that currently applies
under the CFSP (includrng the ESDP);
(b) the EU wishes to give the COPS
powers of decision:
@ the EU henceforth wishes to take ac-
tion in the field of Petersberg missions
rvithout having recourse to WEU, and to
decide on military aspects itself;
(d) the EU wishes to exlend to the field of
secunt_v and defence the possibilities for
closer cooperation for which Article 43
makes provision;
@ the EU is tlunking in terms of adapt-
ing the current system of democratic scru-
tiny to the new situation.
It also has to be borne rn mind that, in its present
form, the Amsterdam Treaty does not contain
any provision goveming relations with NATO
that can be likened to Article IV of the modified
Brussels Treaty.
92. As far as the future of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty is concerned, the onl1, thing on wluch
the EU member goverrments agreed was that the
commitments entered into under Article V will be
preserved for the member states parff to the
Treaty. Although no decision was taken on the
future of the Treaty as a whole, it appears from
the information your Rapporteur was able to
obtain from various sources during the visits he
made in preparation for the present report, that
there is unlikely to be any denunciation or revi-
sion of the Treaty. While the drscussioir is con-
tinuing on the possibility of transfemng certarn
parts of the modified Brussels Treaty, such as
Artrcle IV and even Article V, to the Treaty on
European Union, the most likely outcome 
- 
in
uew of the very different positions of the mem-
ber countries 
- 
is that the Treaty will remain in
force in its present form. In ttris connection it is
important to take note of paragraph I of the
l8
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Council's reply to Recommendation 644 on
"WEU after the Washington and Cologne
Summits" in which it say,s it is "of the opinion
that the modrfied Brussels Treaty continues to
form a valuable part of the European security
architecture, ffid that the obligations ansing
therein should continue to constitute an element
in the development of European security and de-
fence".
93. If one accepts this wordrng, which is nev-
ertheless very vague and cautious, it could be
argued from a legal point of view that the contin-
ued existence of the Treaty would also mean the
continuation of the WEU Council and Assembly
and their activities. However, the Cologne ap-
proach tends to strengthen the viervs of those
who are convinced that once the institutional ar-
rangements envisaged in the European Uruon are
in place, the modrfied Brussels Trealv could
continue to exist on paper but no organisation
will be required to oversee its applicatron.
94. It is important to know how the signatory
states now intend to firlfil their obligations under
paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article MII of the modified
Brussels Treat1,, on the basis of lvhich the WEU
Council was created If the Council continued to
exist solely on paper without any specific activi-
ties, there would be no point rn convening the
Assembly to oversee them. It is certaurly con-
ceivable that certain subsidiary bodies of the
Council, one such being WEAO, rvill continue
their activities outside the EU framework, but it
is difficult to imagine the WEU Assembly confin-
ing itself to scrutinising a few residual activities
and monitoring the application of an Article V
that existed only on paper. What sort of annual
report could a Council w'hich no longer had any
activities make to the Assembly in that sort of
situation?
95 Agai, on the assumption that the modified
Brussels Treaty will be presewed, it would be
perfectly feasible for the Council to decrde to
transfer the exercise of the competence @ut not
the competence itself) it has for cnsis manage-
ment as conferred upon it under Article MII to
the appropriate institutions that will henceforth
come under the ESDP (it irrll be remembered
that the Council transferred the exercise of its
competence for social and cultural affairs to the
Council of Europe ln 1960, and for economic af-
fairs to the European Community in 1970).
96 In such a case the Council rvould be
obliged to include in its annual report all the
EU's activities under the CFSP in so far as they
formed part of the Council's area of competence
in pursuance of Article MII of the modified
Brussels Treatl'. In this wa1'the WEU Assembly
would have a possibility, albeit an rndirect one,
of overseeing CFSP activities. It is true that such
a solution rvould not be ideal and a way of rn-
volvrng the Assembly more directly in CFSP ac-
tivities will have to be sought. However, it would
be one way of ensuring that a transfer of WEU's
functions to the European Union did not iead to
the Assembly berng totally excluded from the
nerv CFSP activities.
97. But there is another aspect that cannot be
overlooked rf the modified Brussels Trea[ 
- 
and
wrth it Article VIII 
- 
remain rn force. The rvord-
ing of that article is extremely flexible and gives
the High Contracting Parties everv latitude to
decide how and in what institutional framervork
they wish to organise the WEU Council as long
as it is "so organised as to be able to exercise its
functions contrnuously". There is therefore every
reason to think that the goverffnents u'ill decide
to go ahead with the transfer of certain functions
of WEU to the European Union, rvrth the possi-
bilrty of members of the new Political and Secu-
riry- Commiuee and members of the WEU Per-
manent Council wearing two hats. The COPS, in
WEU configuration, and the new General Affairs
Council, in the same configuration, could thus be
given responsibilrtl' for rmplementing the provi-
sions of Article VIII of the modified Brussels
Treat_v.
98. Such an arrangement would tie in neatly
with the rationale of appornting Mr Solana, Sec-
retary-General of the EU Council and High Rep-
resentative for the CFSP, to the post of WEU
Secretary-General. However, there is no certainty
that all the governments will wish to fall in rvrth
that rationale rn the present situation.
99. Indeed, in his address to the June session
of the Assembly, Mr Verheugen suggested that a
number of governments, rncluding the German
Government were in favour of an arrangement
whereby, since WEU's functions would be taken
over by the European Union under the CFSP,
they would be subject to scrutrny b1,the Euro-
pean Parliament alone b1, virtue of the Amster-
dam Treaty provisions governing the Parha-
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ment's powers in the field of the CFSP. Under
those provisions, the European Parliament's
powers in that area are more hmited than the pre-
rogatives currentlv exercised by the WEU As-
sembly vis-ir-vis the Council on the basis of Art-
icle lX of the modified Brussels Treat1,. Wlule it
is true that the European Parliament has pre-
rogatives concerning budgetary control over the
EU's activities, thel' apply above all in the
Commumt_v sphere although this could nonethe-
less give the Parliament some influence over
operations conducted rn the intergovemmental
sphere where these rvere funded out of the Com-
munity budget. But that is not sufficient to claim
(as Mr Verheugen did in his address to the As-
sembly) that the European Parliament would
have more nghts in the field of the CFSP than the
Assembly in its relations with the WEU Council.
i00. In vierv of the fact that some governments
are opposed to increasrng the European Parlia-
ment's powers in the field of the CFSP, abolish-
ing the WEU Assembly rvould clearly undermrne
democratic scrutiny of securiw and defence mat-
ters, rvhich is unacceptable. Moreover, when it
comes to monitoring European actilrties in rvhat
is a strictly intergovernmental sphere, a transfer
of the Assembl-v-'s areas of competence to the
European Parliament would constitute an in-
firngement of the fundamental pnnciple of de-
mocrac)' through representation, accordrng to
which scrutrny of European activities based on
sovereign decrsions of the member states should
be exercised by a parliamentary body.made up of
members of the parliaments of the states in ques-
tion, as is the case in the Assembly of WEU. It is
therefore essential, in working to achieve the ob-
jectives set in Cologne, to arrive at an equitable
arra.ngement for the parliamentary dimension of
Europe's future securiw and defence system.
101. The special session the Assembly held on
18-19 October 1999 in Luxembourg and the
adoption of Order 108 on "the parliamentary
dimension of European security and defence: the
challenge for Europe after Cologne" provided an
opporruruq,to give these problems a public focus
and dralv them to the attention of policy-makers
before the decision-making process on rvhich the
governrnents have embarked moves too far
ahead.
102. It is true that at the present time the Euro-
pean Parliament cannot exercise any democratic
control as such over activities under the CFSP.
an)'more than the WEU Assembly can control
those of the WEU Council. While both assem-
blies exist only to be rnformed and consulted and
to formulate proposals, there are nonetheless im-
portant differences betvveen them:
the WEU Council is obliged to make an
annual report on its activities to the As-
sembly rvhereas no such obligation ex-
ists rn the European Union;
- 
the European Parliament has no com-
petence in the field of defence. As it sits
exclusively at 15, it rvould be difficult
for it to exert any influence uhere the
EU decides to carry out a Petersberg
mrssion using the assets of the Atlantic
Alliance and/or where non-EU mem-
bers of NATO take part in such a mis-
sion;
the WEU Assembly is a forum rn
which, as a result of the intergovern-
mental nature of defence policy, 28
European countries debate security and
defence issues;
the Assemblv's members are elected
parliamentanans in their own countries
where they are able to exercise parlia-
mentary control over military decisions.
103. But it is also true that the European Parl-
iament urll not be content with the limited role
the Treatv on European Union assigns to it in the
field of the CFSP and will certaml1, propose
amendments to the Treaty during the Intergov-
ernmental Conference, wrth a view to securing
nider porvers. The questionnarre it sent to Mr
Solana prior to his hearing on 25 October 1999
in Strasbourg before its Commrttee on Foreign
Affairs. Human Rrghts and the Common Secu-
nty'and Defence Policy, glves some indication as
to the Parliament's intentions. The last question
read as follows:
''Once the WEU's tasks have been taken
over by the EU, will it not be necessar), to
have democratic control over this policy
by securing a clear role for the European
Parliament rn morutoring the development
which rvill affect it?"
104. At its special session in Luxembourg, in
which a delegation from the European Parliament
took part. the Assembl), set itself the objective of
20
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looking into appropnate arrangements for coop-
eration wrth the European Parliament on the ba-
sis of the complementant-v of their respective
areas of competence. The EP representatives
welcomed this approach but it is not yet known
what the Parliament's reaction urll be. In any
event, the idea of collective participation by na-
tional parliaments, along the lines of the
COSAC, for the purpose of exercising scrutiny
over the European security and defence policy
would not seem to be a satisfactory solution.
105. The action the Assembll' decides to take
will depend on how the European Parliament sees
its oun role in this area. If it considers it should
have an exclusive prerogatlve as regards securitl'
and defence matters, then steps will have to be
taken to ensure that the Intergovernmental Con-
ference takes account of the parliamentar)' di-
mension in its discussions in such a way as to
accommodate the national parliaments' collective
interest in monitoring government activities in the
sphere ofsecurity and defence. To that end, pro-
vision rvould have to be made in the Trealv on
European Union for the creation of a chamber
made up of national parliamentanans.
106. ln order for the Cologne project as a whole
to be successful, it is important to note that the
first step consists in achieving the following main
objectives:
(a) strenglhening European military ca-
pabilities;
(b) giving Europe a decision-makrng ca-
paclty enabling it to act quickly enough
when a crisis erupts.
107. The solution to the problem of horv to
strengthen mrlitary capabilities does not depend
on the settlement of institutional issues and can
therefore be dealt rvrth in the frameworks created
for this purpose. In tlus respect the Cologne
Declaration and the British-Italian Joint Declara-
tion could be very useful for giving the process a
political impetus. It is not necessary to amend the
treaties to make Europe ''operational" ard auto-
nomous in this area but llhat does need to be
done is to ensure there is a common political uill.
The lessons drawn from the Kosovo conflict
probably do a great deal more to generate that
will than anl. speech advocating grand designs,
or anv orgarusational project.
108. Improving the decisron-making process is
a more complicated matter. In point of fact, it is
not the number of organisations that prevents the
governments from taking the necessary decisions
to handle a cnsis. The real problem will not be
solved by transfemng WEU's decision-makrng
responsibilitl'to the CFSP. it wrll be no easier to
take decisions under the CFSP than it is in WEU,
given that both apply the pnnciple of unanimity,
requinng the agreement of all participants.
109. In the absence ofany real leadership, such
as exists in the Atlantic Alliance rvhere the
United States plays a domrnant role, the Euro-
pean Union will find that rvhen it rvishes to take
action under the CFSP, it wili have the same dif-
ficulty in obtaining the necessarl' consensus as
WEU does at present. In view of the fact that
there are more fulI members in the EU (15 as
against 10 in WEU), those difficulties could be
even greater. On the other hand, it must also be
borne in mrnd that after WEU drsappears, the
pressure from public opimon on EU bodies to
prove the;'can act credibly could strengthen the
member states' political resolve to meet that ex-
pectation.
1 10. But to be put under pressure to succeed is
no guarantee of success. Additional measures
lrill be needed to increase the chances of that
happenrng The most difficult challenge is to re-
open the debate on the introduction of rules on
qualified majorit_v voting in a decision-making
process. Germany is one of the most ardent sup-
porters of such a change. So far no initiative rn
this area has stood the slightest chance of being
adopted. But even though this is a particularly
sensitive matter, it has to be realised that the
more members there are in the European institu-
tions, the more urgent it will become to find a
solution to the problem of the votrng method.
Any'change to the method that rs incorporated in
the Treatl' on European Union could easily be
applied in WEU since Article VIII of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty already makes provision for
voting procedures, other than that of unammiq',
as mav have been or may be agreed.
111. In this connection it should also be noted
that even in the field of defence, Article MII.4 of
the modified Brussels Treatl'makes provision for
a number of rules on qualified ma1onty voting
where decisions are to be taken in application of
the Protocols annexed to the Treaty These range
2l
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from a vote by a simple maJont, to one by a two-
thrrds majont-v In the European Umon the pos-
sibilrty of constructive abstention already exists
but does not apply in the case of matters having
military or defence implications.
ll2. [n contrast, the principle of constructive
abstention has already'been applied de facto n
action taken by WEU during the first and second
Gulf wars, as a result of the flexibilrty of Article
VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treatv. However,
the voting problem is not the onlv one that has to
be resolved. There is also the problem of the very
drfferent working methods that hare developed in
WEU and the EU. If an organisation is to act
rapidly and effectively rn the face of a crisis that
threatens the securitv of its member states, it
must be extremely flexible. But all the EU rnsti-
tutions work on a very formal legal basis and
seek to solve problems by drau'rng up outline
prograrnmes and procedures together rvith direc-
tives containing legal provisions and wording.
113. This highly formal legal approach in the
EU institutions can be seen in the highly complex
procedure that has been follorved in the rare
cases to date where the European Uruon has
availed itself of WEU to request it to elaborate
and implement an EU decision havrng mrlitary
implications. The most stnkrng example is the
complexity of the modus operandt and the flow-
chart for cooperation betw'een WEU and the
European Union in the event of a crisis, rvhich
are annexed to the arrangements concluded be-
tween WEU and the EU to lmprove cooperation
betrveen the trvo orgaru.sations. A study of those
documents sometimes gir-es the impression that
they were drau.n up with a clear intention to
show that cooperation will never be feasible.
114. All this goes to shovv that the working
methods in WEU and the European Union are
profoundly different. In this respect, WEU has an
important responsibilrty to ensure that it transfers
to the relevant EU bodies a method of rvork that
ui1l enable them to react to a given cnsis urth the
necessan' flexibilitv and speed.
1 1 5 . Finallv, account must be taken of the diffi-
culties that can be anticipated r,vhen it comes to
amending the Amsterdam Treatv at the forthcom-
rng Intergovernmental Conferencc. u,here secu-
nty and defence matters are not the main subject
on the agenda. In order to keep the necessary
amendments dorr,n to a minimum, it u'ould be
highly expedrent to seek solutions that allow the
objectives to be achieved while making as ferv
changes as possible to the treaties. The transi-
tional period, during which intenm solutions mav
be applied, is an important opporfumt_v for the
Assembly to float ideas and submit appropnate
proposals for the IGC discussions.
IV The tosk facing WEU and its Assembly
116. A paticular feature of WEU as an organi-
sation is that it includes all those European
countries prepared to commrt themselves u,ithout
reservation to the task of building securiq' and
defence Europe, which is already becoming a
reality that transcends the framervork of the
European Union as it is today. But the joint pol-
icy of WEU and the EU since the Maastricht
Treatv has been to bring the trvo organisations
closer together so that WEU becomes an integral
part of the development of the European Union
and in its own specific area a forerunner, as rt
were, of tomorrow's European Union.
117. Nevertheless, the fact that WEU has been
separate from the European Union until norv has
had its advantages in that:
it has been possible for WEU to be
used as an essential element of the de-
velopment of the European Securiq,
and Defence Identrty (ESDD within the
Alliance:
it has made WEU 
- 
at least for an in-
tenm penod 
- 
an important ''alternat-
ive" or "staging post" for all those
European countries rvhose accession to
the EU and/or NATO still poses major
problems, by givrng them the possibil-
rty of playing a full part in its rvork on
securiw and defence matters;
it has enabled EU countries pursuing a
policv of non-alignment to drarv closer
to NATO, and
in doing so, it has created the right
condrtions for building defence Europe
with the full participation of all the in-
terested countries, regardless ofthe fact
that thel' have to meet all the requisite
conditions before qualifring for admis-
sion to the EU's first, second and third
pillars.
22
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118. Follou'ing the Cologne decisions to de-
velop a common European secunt-v and defence
policy (ESDP) in the smgle frameu'ork of the
European Union- not including collective defence
for the time being, the countries entitled to play a
full part in this project are automatically reduced
to the 15 EU member states.
119. As only the 15 EU member states have a
right of decision in the field of the CFSP, WEU
still has an important task ahead of it in order to
ensure that the ESDP develops in harmony' rvith
the ESDI in the Alliance- in rvhich a number of
non-EU countnes are tnvolved. Given the Euro-
pean Umon's determination to preserve a single
rnstitutional framervork in all its areas of activitl',
it rvould be drfficult for it to replace WEU as an
essential element of the ESDI. If WEU as an or-
ganisation were to disappear, NATO q'ould take
on sole responsibility for the ESDI as conceived
at present. Establishing direct relations betrveen
the EU and NATO would not change tlus sirua-
tlon.
120. As regards WEU's other missions, de-
scribed in paragraph ll8, the decision taken in
Cologne to drarv a clear distinction bet*'een the
common European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) and collectrve defence. in other words to
carve up WEU's various functtons, wrll probabll'
compromise once and for all an), chance there
was of aclueving defence Europe at 28 more
rapidll'than an enlarged European Union. From
no\\, on, the pace rvrll be dictated b1' considera-
tions that have nothing to do rvith secunty and
defence proper.
l2l. WEU as an "alternative" solution and a
"staging post" will become far less attractive to
countries, such as Turkcl'. rvhich will not be able
to join the EU for a long time to come. Moreover.
this nerv state of affairs has removed all 1ustifi-
cation for the enlargement policy WEU has been
following untrl norv, according to u'hich a coun-
try had to be a member of both the EU and
NATO in order to accede to the modified Brus-
sels Treatl.
I22. If the European Union refuses to become a
mrlitan alliance and sees itself first and foremost
as a power for peace. there is now nothing to
prevent WEU inviting all the European countries
of the Atlantic Alliance (as WEU associate mem-
bers) to accede to the modified Brussels Treatl'
and hence to subscnbe to Artrcle V.
I23. Such a policy would considerabll' streng-
then the ESDI and allow defence Europe to bring
more influence to bear in the Alliance.
124. WEU still has an important task to com-
plete in its configuration at 28 since it lvould ap-
pear that the enlargement of NATO on the one
hand and the European Union on the other are
not going to proceed at the same pace or in the
same direction. Whereas NATO could open up to
south-eastern Europe, it looks as though the Bal-
tic states have a real chance ofjoining the Euro-
pean Union. Grven tlus situation, the WEU
Council should conduct a studl- of the role the
various components of the modified Brussels
Treatl' and WEU, as an organisation. can still
play in Europe's current securiry' architecture by
identifi'ing, among other things, aw aspects that
cannot be covered by either the European Union
or NATO.
125. Such a contribution is essential for the
authorities considering how to implement the de-
cisions taken in the Cologne Declaration to have
a better grasp of the impact of those decisions
and, rvhere appropriate, to seek other solutions
126. As u,ell as assisting the European Union in
that way. the WEU Council should immediately
draw up an inventory of the tasks that u'rll con-
trnue to be its responsibility under the Treatl'
once responsibiliq' for Petersberg tasks has been
fully transferred to bodres in the EU. This will
entail workrng out the practical implications of
the Council's reply to Recommendation 644,
which confirms that the modified Brussels Treaty
continues to form a valuable part of the Euro-
pean secunq, architecture and that the obliga-
tions arisrng therein should continue to constitute
an element in the det'elopment of European se-
curity and defence.
127 ln general terms, the member governments
of WEU should therefore consider the Treaty not
merelv as a relic of the past that conttnues to ex-
rst simply'because agreement cannot be reached
on puttrng an end to it. but as an instrument that
may prove useful for setthng problems that can-
not be settled elservhere. In this respect the pro-
vision contained in Article XI on the conditions
for enlargement could take on a new dimension in
relation to the problems that u'ill arise regarding
the associate members' and associate partners'
involvement rn the Cologne process.
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128. As far as armaments cooperation is con-
cerned, it is to be noted that the WEAG mimsters
are already working on arrangements for opening
up this area to all those natlons in the WEU fam-
ilv interested in participating.
129. In tlus respect, vour Rapporteur uishes to
stress that Recommendatron 626 on "secunty in
a rvider Europe"ll and Recommendation 639 on
''the political and legal consequences of WEU's
enlargement to take in non-signatory countnes of
the modified Brussels Treat\,"lr remain as rele-
vant as ever. The need to build a solid legal basis
for armaments cooperation. open to an)' inter-
ested nation belonging to the WEU famrly ard
given rmpetus by an effective political forum, has
become even greater followrng the Washrngton
and Cologne Summits and the entry into force of
the Amsterdam Trea['.
130. In vierv of the number of countries inter-
ested in such cooperation 
- 
far more than the 15
EU member states 
- 
the legal basis rvtuch should
be chosen for this purpose rs the modrfied Brus-
sels Treaty'and the 11 May 1955 Agreement on
the status of WEU. This u'ould not only pro.i.rde
additional legal ammunition for the political mo-
mentum rvhich should be generated by the rele-
vant mimsters, but wouid also ensure that, on the
parliamentary side, the process is morutored and
given a further fillip by the WEU Assembly.
131. This would not stand in the way of in-
creased activrt_v on the parr of the appropnate EU
authorities in those areas of armarnents coopera-
tion w-hich affect Community aspects proper.
WEU could even propose that the EU avail itself
of the instruments of the Trea[' on European
Union to develop a common strategy for Euro-
pean capabilities that are to be used for crisis-
management operations. Converselv, it has to be
realised that any ideas about a wholesale transfer
of all the dimensions of armaments cooperation
to the second EU pillar, under the supervision of
a Council of Defence Ministers, is bound to
throrv up the problem of the participation of
countries that are not members of the European
Union.
11 Adopted by the Assembly on
Document 1602.
12 Adopted by the Assembly on
see Document 1625.
18 May 1998, see
2 December 1998,
132. One partrcular problem that will arise con-
cems the future place of Europe's arms export
policy'. wluch is currently restricted in practice to
the Fifteen. In the interests of consistency wrth
cooperation on a[nrlments. it is to be recom-
mended that thrs problem be discussed in the
wider framework of WEU and WEAG.
133. In the present post-Cologne interim situa-
tlon. appropriate arrangements must be found to
prevent any weakening in WEU's capacity to act
as an operational instrument dunng the period of
negotiatrons leading up to the new structures en-
visaged by the European Council. In that context,
the WEU Secretary-6eneral is to be applauded
for his comments at the Luxembourg special
session to the effect that: "It is clear that WEU
still has an important part to plav, and it would
be dangerous to empt_v of their substance the
structures currentlv in existence at WEU, prema-
turely, before effective permanent structures have
been set up rvithin the European Union".
131. Tlus note of rvarmng is most apt at a time
uhen the conflict rn East Trmor and the latest
war in Chechnya have served as a reminder to
Europe that Kosovo xrll not be the last crisis and
that it must be prepared to tackle other emergen-
cies. At the same time, American representatives
have again rvarned Europe that the United States
is becoming rncreasingly frustrated about having
to bear the major share of the burden of ensuring
transatlantic security.
135. Whereas cooperation between WEU and
NATO with a view to making the necessary ar-
rangements for European operations under the
political control and strategic drrection of WEU
and using NATO assets appears to be fairly well
advanced, work on cooperation betrveen WEU
and the European Union in the event of a crisis is
still proving exlremely, complicated and very
slow. The first part of the 45th annual report of
the Council to the Assembly on the activities of
the Council provides some rnterestrng informa-
tion in this respect.
136. In the first place, the arrangements for
enhanced cooperation bets'een the EU and WEU,
in pursuance of the Protocol to Article 17 of the
Treaty on European Union, came rnto force at
the same time as the Treaty itself. The flowchart
on cooperation between the trvo organisations,
annexed to the document setting out the arrange-
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ments, is exlremely complicated as it is, even
without takrng account of NATO's involvement
in the process. To make things worse, the docu-
ment appears to be serving as an arbitrator rn
some sort of competition between the European
Umon and WEU on the subject of the "emer-
gence of a crisis situation and its evaluation".
137. For the first phase it states that: "In view
of the broader scope of means of action available
to the EU, it is likely that the more comprehen-
sive assessment of the situation and, if needed,
the development of a comprehensive approach
for addressing the emergrng cnsis, will take place
in the EU". But at the same time it also states
that: "The WEU Council may also take the ini-
tiative to seise the Council of the EU of a crisis
situation and to provrde the EU uith assessments
and options for action as far as its oun area of
responsibilitl, is concerned". In the second phase,
the European Union becomes more closely in-
volved in the matter, which it refers first to the
Political Committee and COREPER, and possl-
blv also the European Council, before the Gen-
eral Affairs Council is able to take a decision.
i 3 8. In this connection, the first part of the 45th
annual report ofthe Council refers to a decision
it took concerning the EU document on an initial
list of types of situation in which the EU may
avail itself of WEU and on the basis of wluch
meetings are held betrveen the relevant WEU and
EU bodies, among other thrngs for the purpose of
strengthening cooperation between the WEU
Military Staff and the European Union.
139. As the annual report does not provide any
information on the content of the relevant dis-
cussions, it is impossible to say whether the cur-
rent arrangements have any chance of being ap-
plied in the event of an unforeseeable crisis. The
discussions that are under way wrth a vierv to the
EU taking drrect charge of all Petersberg opera-
tions merely complicate matters further.
140. ln this transitional period it is once again
necessary to make the point that, ut view of the
difficulties the European Uruon currently has in
avarllrg itself of WEU in a cnsis and the time it
rvill take before the EU is able to take action on
its own, WEU must preserve all its operational
capabilrties that are based on the modified Brus-
sels Treaty (Article VIII.3) and on the procedures
it has established to enable its Council to take an
appropriate decisron in response to a crisis and to
permit its various bodies to implement that deci-
sion.
l4l. It is also clear from the arurual report of
the Council that the informal reflection on Euro-
pean secunq' and defence is continuing and that
it is not confined to an audit of existrng capabili-
ties. The Assembly can but urge the Council to
take this reflection further and inform it of the
conclusions to be draun. It particularly rvel-
comes the Council's statement in its report re-
gardrng "the need for WEU to be operationally
effective, u'rth the involvement and participation
of all WEU nations in accordance wrth their
stafus".
I42. As far as the institutional changes to be
made in the European Umon are concerned, the
WEU Council should, among other things, rede-
fine its own future and the tasks incumbent upon
it as a result of its obligations under Article MII
of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly in
respect of the missions assigned to the EU Gen-
eral Affairs Council and to the Political and Se-
cunty Commrttee (COPS) w'hich is to be created.
In carryrng out such an assessment, the Council
should concentrate on the future application of
Article \rIII.1 uhich refers to matters concerning
the execution of the Treaty. It would also be ex-
pedient for it to study its future composition,
takrng account ofthe provisions of paragraph 2
and the decision-makrng structures to be set up in
the European Union. Particular thought u'ill need
to be given to the future application of para-
graph 3, u'hich will continue to be fully relevant
rn the event of a cnsis.
143 The Council may decide to alter the voting
procedure, as Article VIII.4 authorises it to do,
taking into account changes tlat have been made
in other European bodies or even in anticipation
of such changes. Furthermore, it should study
rval's of ensuring the application in the future of
Articles ry, V and, in particular, IX. It also
needs to revise its current enlargement policy on
the basis of Article XI. In this connection the
Assembll, fully shares the opinion the Council
ex?resses in its reply to Recommendation 644. irt
u'hich it states that "the modified Brussels Treaty
continues to form a valuable part of the Euro-
pean secunty architecture and that the obliga-
tions ansing therein should continue to constitute
an element rn the development of European se-
cunty and defence".
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144. When appointing Mr Solana as the neu,
WEU Secretary-General. the Council should take
all the steps necessary to enhance the Secretary-
General's status 
- 
rn the same wa-v as was pro-
posed in the Chirac-Schroder letter for the post
Mr Solana holds in the European Union. Estab-
lishing close relations betu,een the Assembll' and
the nerv Secretan-General u'ill be beneficial for
the Organisation as a rvhole.
145 As for the Assembh', it must first and
foremost continue to fulfil all the tasks conferred
upon it bv Article IX of the Treaq,. On this point
the Council's statement in its reply to Recom-
mendation 644 to the effect that it rs "conscious
of the importance of the parliamentan, dimension
to the debate on European secunt_v and defence"
is to be rvelcomed. For as long as the Treaw ex-
ists, the Assembh'must above all else continue to
remind the Council of all its contractual obliga-
tions and must urge it to keep up all the activities
resulting from them. ln addition. the Assembly
should continue to involve its associate members
and associate partners more closely in its u'ork,
not to mention the delegations of the observer
countries rvho should take advantage ofthe fact
that their status has been considerably enhanced
rn the frameu'ork of the Council's activities.
146. For the time being, the Assembly's exis-
tence is not being called rnto question but the
future impact of its work will dcpend on the role
to be assigned to the Council in the neu, institu-
tional arrangements. That is rvhv the timc has
come to formulate open-ended options pointing
the governments in the right direcilon for build-
ing the democratic drmension of secuntv and de-
fence Europe. It is therefore lmportant not to rule
out any arrangement for changing the Assem-
bl1"s composition and the x'av in uhich its mem-
bers are appointed, as long as the]' continue to
come from the parhaments of the member coun-
tnes
147. The Assemblv intends to take its consid-
erations on the future of the parliamentary di-
mension further. on the basis of the general rvav
fonvard it has alreadv descnbed rn Order 108,
adopted at the special session in Luxembourg.
148. Its considerations must of necessity. rn-
clude the European Parliament. x,ith xluch it u,ill
need to increase its contacts. it should also study
the possibilitv of cooperation xith the Parliament
on the basis of the pnncrples of complementarity
and reciprocity. In view of the complextty and
importance of this matter, it u'ould be highly' de-
sirable for the WEU Assembll' and the European
Parliament to reach agreement on joint proposals
dunng the first half of 2000. The Assemblv's
prelimrnary contacts u,ith the nerv European Parlia-
ment. the participatron of an EP delegatron in its
special session and the presence of an Assembly
deiegation at Mr Solana's hearing before the EP
Commiuee on Forergn Affarrs- Human Rigtrts
and the Common Security' and Defence Policy
are all to be seen as encouraging signs.
V Conclusions
149. The Washington. Bremen and Cologne de-
clslons shorv that Europeans have reached a
crossroads and have to choose betrr-een a number
of options. One of these. rvluch is currently pop-
ular with the heads of state and government of
the Fifteen, is to achieve a European secunfi- and
defence capabilitl' rn the srngle framework of the
European Uruon, leal,rng aside collective defence
for the time being. The advantage of this option
is that it strengthens the EU's umN of action,
albeit at the risk of sidelinrng all those non-EU
countries alreadl'rnvolved in one way or another
rn the prolect of defence Europe, and some of
which even participate rn collectrve defence
proper.
150. Its disadvantage, however, is that it re-
quires new institutional arrangements and am-
endments to the Treatres, matters on rvhich rt will
not be eas\. to reach agreement. The desire to
maintain the European Union's single frame-
u'ork, u'ithin u'hich some member states still re-
fuse to discuss an\thing to do rvith mrlitary mat-
ters, can onlv lead to unsatisfactory compronrises
and ivr1l leave the business of European con-
struction unfinished.
151. But there is another option: a composite
Europe able to act in a crisis and also capable of
defending itself x'ith the assistance of anv coun-
tries prepared to be involved. Such a Europe is
burit around the WEU family and is readv to
merge rvith the Europe of the Fifteen provided a
merger is not orchestrated in a hurn', does not
create vet another bureaucracy, does not abandon
anvone along the rvay, and on condition that the
structure it produces is full1' complementar)' to
the Atlantic Alliance.
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l5Z. The Intergovernmental Conference that is
to open next 1'ear has a difficult agenda. It is
Europe's major shortcomings mthe area of mili-
tary capabilities that are paralysing any action it
might take in a crisis, so the first thing that needs
to be done is to look at the measures needed to
make good those shortcomings. Institutional mat-
ters and the desire to act rn a single framework
should not become the priorit-v. The main prob-
lem concerns Europe's political will to have a
capabilit-v enabling it to respond to a crisis. The
WEU Council of Ministers u'hich is to meet in
Luxembourg on 23 November 1999, and the EU
summrt meetrng to be held in Helsinki on 10-11
December, are important milestones that wrll
provide an opporlunrty to give that political will
a fresh impetus.
153. In the meantime, it is essential for WEU to
continue its rvork to become a fully operational
instrument avarlable to Europe's decision-makers.
Until all the EU member states are readv to part-
icipate wrthout reservation in al1 aspects of the
secunty and defence dimension and for as long as
the European Union rs not prepared for all the
European non-EU members of the Atlantic Alli-
ance to play a frrll part in the project mapped out
rn Cologne. it rvould be a serious mistake to try
to rush things by adopting uniform and strict
legal formulas for secunq' and defence in the
framework of a revision of the Treat-v on Euro-
pean Union. While mrlitar-v action mus! of course,
rest on a solid legal basis, u'hat it requires above
all else is a very rvide measure of political flex-
ibilrty 
- 
and that even extends to the structures
rvhere decisions are made.
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